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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to examine the incentive of a player
to join a syndicate in an environment of team production and payoff
distribution according to Shapley value. We consider an economy in
which a single output is produced by an increasing returns to scale
production function using two inputs: labor and capital. By assuming
that syndicates of factor owners can form, we are interested in their
stability, i.e., the willingness of the members of the syndicate to stay
in the syndicate. Our analysis, based on the Shapley value, allows us
to find a fair imputation of the gains of cooperation and the conditions
under which syndicates are stable.
Keywords: Shapley value, Increasing returns to scale, Syndicate
of factor owners.
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1 Introduction
It seems intuitively obvious that the formation of binding agreements be-
tween the members of a group of economic agents improves their bargaining
power. Trade unions, syndicates of property owners or of consumers pro-
vide natural examples of this phenomenon. The purpose of this paper is to
give a rationale for this in a cooperative game setting. The problem is the
following: What is the influence of binding agreements on the outcome of
bargaining processes? Under which conditions are such binding agreements
stable?
Following Gabszewicz and Dre`ze [1971], we will term a syndicate a group
of identical agents who delegate to a single decision unit the task of repre-
senting their economic interests. This leads to assimilate a syndicate to a
single agent. As remarked by Guesnerie [1977], the study of syndicates so
defined raises the question of their stability, i.e., the willingness of the mem-
bers of the syndicate to stay in the syndicate. This stability will depend
upon the advantages the syndicate gives to its members and different com-
parisons seem relevant for evaluating them. The first one is the comparison
of the situation of the syndicate members in the presence, or absence, of
the syndicate; this is the notion of total stability defined by Gabszewicz and
Dre`ze [1971]. The second one is the comparison of the situation of syndi-
cated and nonsyndicated agents of the same type when there is a syndicate;
this is the notion of marginal stability defined by Gabszewicz and Dre`ze
[1971]. We introduce a third and new comparison which consists in assum-
ing that a syndicate of one type has already formed and we are interested in
the reaction of the agents of the other type. This raises the following ques-
tion: Will the formation of a syndicate of one type induce the formation of
a syndicate of another type?
The stability of syndicates has been studied in the context of a productive
economy using the core solution concept (Hansen and Gabszewicz [1972]).
Hansen and Gabszewicz consider the case of a productive economy in which
the production possibilities are characterized by constant returns to scale.
Then, one may wonder what happens when returns are increasing. In that
context, we consider economies of scale since production is cheaper when
scale is larger. This is for example the case when we consider the economy
of software engineering where some programmers can concentrate more on
particular kinds of programming, and get better at them.
Gabszewicz [1996] recognized that core solution concept is rather limited
when returns are increasing. First of all, the equal-treatment property does
not hold in the core, i.e., agents of the same type can receive a different
amount.1 Therefore, the equal treatment property, which is satisfied in a
1Following Gabszewicz [1996], let us assume an economy in which a single output is
produced by an increasing returns to scale production function using only one input, given
by F (z) = z2. By assuming that the economy consists of five factor owners and that each
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productive economy characterized by constant returns to scale, is no longer
satisfied when returns are increasing. Second, generally the larger the degree
of increasing returns, the larger the core will be and the more the core
solution will be unsuitable. Indeed, it is intuitively clear that the more
pronounced is the degree of increasing returns, the more difficult it will be
for proper subgroups to do better by their own means and therefore the
more we could depart from the proportional imputation while remaining in
the core.
So the core solution concept is not a very appropriate one, in a productive
economy characterized by increasing returns to scale, due to the large core
and hence the need for a deterministic allocation. Another solution seems
more appropriate, namely the Shapley value. Indeed, the Shapley value
is a solution concept which attempts to describe a reasonable, or “fair”,
way to divide the gains from cooperation and a powerful tool for evaluating
the power structure in a coalitional game. The criterion of fairness to which
value theory adheres is egalitarianism: the aim is to distribute the gains from
cooperation equally. Moreover, given a game, the Shapley value assigns to
it a single outcome - in contrast, the core solution assigns a set of outcomes.
This is the reason why we investigate in this paper the stability of syndicates
when the allocation of the gains of cooperation is governed by the Shapley
value.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we state our assumptions
and we determine the Shapley values according to various states of compe-
tition. Section 3 contains the results. We show that a monopoly syndicate
can increase the bargaining power of its members in terms of the Shapley
value. Sufficient conditions are given for a monopoly to be stable.
2 The model
2.1 Assumptions
We consider an economy in which a single output is produced by an increas-
ing returns to scale production function using two inputs or factors: labor
and capital. Following Hansen and Gabszewicz [1972], we assume that these
inputs are initially distributed among a given set of factor owners and that
any coalition of owners has initial access to its aggregate input endowment.
agent owns initially a single unit of the input, the total output which can be produced in
the economy is then 25. Let x be an imputation defined by
x = (x1, x2, x3, x4, x5) = (1, 3, 5, 7, 9)
We can easily check that this imputation, which assigns a different amount to identical
agents, belongs to the core!
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The economy consists of a set I1 of workers - each owning initially a
single unit of labor - and a set I2 of capitalists - each owning initially a
single unit of capital. There are two types of agents, namely:
I1 = {11, . . . , 1j, . . . , 1n}
and I2 = {21, . . . , 2j, . . . , 2n},
where I1 denotes the set of labor owners with |I1| = n; I2, the set of capital
owners with |I2| = n and N , the set of all factor owners with N = I1 ∪ I2.
2
We assume that the production function of the economy is a Cobb-
Douglas function:
F (z1, z2) = z
α
1 · z
β
2 ,
where α > 0, β > 0, α+ β > 1 and zi, the units of factors.
The total output which can be produced in the economy is:
F (n, n) = nα+β .
We are then interested in the imputation of this amount among the fac-
tor owners. In other words, the problem is the following: How can we impute
the total output among the workers and the capitalists?
By definition, an imputation is a 2n-tuple of numbers
(x11, . . . , x1j , . . . , x1n;x21, . . . , x2j , . . . , x2n)
satisfying:
n∑
j=1
x1j +
n∑
j=1
x2j = n
α+β,
where x1j denotes the amount received by a worker j, and x2j the amount
obtained by a capitalist j.
Interesting imputations can be obtained through a collective decision
mechanism. Indeed, some coalitions can form in order to improve their
bargaining power. Consider a given coalition S composed of some workers
(i.e., s1 = |S ∩ I1|) and some capitalists (i.e., s2 = |S ∩ I2|). The coalition S
can produce, on its own means, an amount of output F (s1, s2). This defines
the characteristic function, v, by:
v (S) = F (s1, s2) = s
α
1 · s
β
2 , for all S ⊂ N .
To obtain these imputations, we will define the Shapley value associated
with this characteristic function.
2|I1| = |I2| allows us to avoid size effects.
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Following Gabszewicz and Dre`ze [1972] and Gabszewicz [1996], we first
assume that any group of factor owners is free to form a coalition, and also
to disband it. A factor owner is then free to join or leave any coalition.
What happens if some factor owners decide to act together as one unit
relative to the rest of the agents? Let us introduce the notion of syndicate.
We define a syndicate as a group of identical agents, i.e., a group of agents
of the same type, who agree that no proper subset of them can act inde-
pendently from the group itself. In this case, it is no longer true that the
formation of any coalition is possible: any proper subset of these groups is
no longer a feasible coalition, only those coalitions which either contain all
the members of the group or contain none of them are admissible. The set
of permissible coalitions is then restricted. Moreover, as members of the
syndicate are identical players, it is natural to suppose that all members of
the group will accept an equal treatment, i.e., an equal sharing of the gains
of cooperation. Consider then the syndicates that factor owners can form:
Let us call Ji a syndicate of agents of type i, where Ji ⊂ Ii, i = 1, 2.
By assuming that syndicates of factor owners can form, we are interested
in their stability, i.e., the willingness of the members of the syndicate to stay
in the syndicate. So, the question is: Under what conditions will stable syn-
dicates exist? Different definitions of stability might explain the formation
of syndicates. The first one compares the amount a syndicate member can
obtain with what he would have received if the syndicates did not exist; this
is the total stability of Aumann [1973], called A-stability.
Definition 1 A syndicate Ji is A-stable if xij > x
′
ij, ∀ij ∈ Ji, where xij
is the amount received by a syndicate member ij when Ji 6= ∅, and x
′
ij the
amount received by a syndicate member ij when Ji = ∅ (every player ij is
independent).
The second definition consists in comparing the situations of a syndicated
and nonsyndicated agent of the same type, when there is a syndicate. This
is the marginal stability of Gabzsewicz and Dre`ze [1971], called B-stability.
Definition 2 A syndicate Ji is B-stable if xij > xik, ∀ij ∈ Ji and ∀ik ∈
Ii\Ji, where xij is the amount received by a syndicate member ij and xik
the amount received by a nonsyndicate member ik of the same type when Ji
6= ∅.
Finally, we introduce an alternative definition of stability which we call
C-stability. This definition rests on the assumption that a syndicate of some
type is formed and we are interested in the reaction of the agents of the other
type: Do they form a syndicate or decide to remain separate? In order to
5
answer this question, we compare the situation of a syndicate member when
the two types of syndicates exist, and when its own syndicate does not exist.
Definition 3 A syndicate J1 (resp. J2) is C-stable if x1j > x
′′
1j, ∀1j ∈ J1,(
resp. x2j > x
′′
2j, ∀2j ∈ J2
)
, where x1j (resp. x2j) is the amount received by
a syndicate member 1j (resp. 2j) when J1, J2 6= ∅ and x
′′
1j
(
resp. x′′2j
)
the
amount received by a syndicate member 1j (resp. 2j) when J1 = ∅ (every
player 1j is independent), J2 6= ∅ (resp. J1 6= ∅, J2 = ∅) .
2.2 Payoff Distribution by the Shapley value
In order to study the incentive of a player to join a syndicate, it is necessary
to determine the imputation each factor owner can obtain according to var-
ious states of competition. The solution concept we are dealing with is the
Shapley value defined by Shapley [1953].
2.2.1 Shapley value with no syndicate
In an economy with no syndicate, agents of the same type are not con-
strained to behave identically. Then there are 2n independent players in the
game.
The value of the game, to a given player, can be described intuitively as
his average marginal worth over all possible coalitions. Hence, for a situation
of perfect competition, we get the following expression for the Shapley value
of factor owner j of type i:
ϕi =
∑
S⊂N
ij /∈S
s! (2n− s− 1)!
(2n)!
[v (S ∪ {ij})− v (S)] , for all S ⊂ N ,
∀j = 1, . . . , n and i = 1, 2 and where s denotes the number of players in S,
s = |S|.
Theorem 1 In a productive economy with increasing returns to scale, the
Shapley value, denoted by ϕ = (ϕ1, ϕ2), and the asymptotic Shapley value,
denoted by ϕ(n) ∼ (ϕ1(n), ϕ2(n)), are given by:
(i) symmetric agents: α = β ⇒ ϕ = (12n
2α−1, 12n
2α−1), ∀n.
(ii) asymmetric agents: α 6= β ⇒ ϕ ∼ ( αα+β n
α+β−1, βα+β n
α+β−1),
for n large enough.
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Proof. With increasing returns to scale, production functions are quasi-
concave but not concave. Thus, the Shapley value does not converge to the
classical “competitive equilibrium” solution when the number of agents is
increased3.
(i) With symmetric agents, the proof is immediate. Since the Shapley
value gives the same value to all the identical players, the total amount of
output, F (n, n), is equally shared between the 2n players, i.e.:
ϕ1 = ϕ2 =
F (n, n)
2n
⇔ ϕ1 = ϕ2 =
1
2n
2α−1,∀n.
(ii) With asymmetric agents, the proof is less immediate. Suppose that
there is a large finite number n of players, each of whom is individually
insignificant. We know from Aumann and Shapley [1974] that there exists
another way of defining the value: The infinite-person game is approximated
by games with finitely many players (with the aid of sequences of increasingly
fine partitions of the players space) and it is proved that the value for finite
games (called the “asymptotic value”) coincides with the value for non-
atomic games.
As a first step in the proof, we define the value for non-atomic games.
Let x1 be the fraction of workers owning a single unit of labor and zero
unit of capital, i.e., (1, 0) ; and let x2 be the fraction of capitalists owning a
single unit of capital and zero unit of labor, i.e., (0, 1). Thus, the function
F (x1, x2) = x
α
1 · x
β
2 determines the output which can be produced in this
normalized game. Then, the Shapley value is given by the following diagonal
formula:
ϕ =
∫ 1
0
(∇F )t(1,1) dt,
where (∇F ) denotes the gradient of the function F (x1, x2).
We obtain
ϕ = (α, β)
1
α+ β
And we deduce the asymptotic value for our finite game as{
ϕ1(n) ∼
α
α+β n
α+β−1, for n large enough.
ϕ2(n) ∼
β
α+β n
α+β−1, for n large enough.

We can note that the game associated with the characteristic function
v (S) = sα1 · s
β
2 , for all S ⊂ N, is convex if α ≥ 1 and β ≥ 1. Therefore, the
Shapley value, ϕi, belongs to the core if the marginal productivities with
respect to all inputs are increasing. Then, in a productive economy with
no syndicate and characterized by increasing returns to scale, the Shapley
3Shapley [1964] proved that in a k-fold market with transferable utility and concave
utility functions, the value converges to the competitive solution.
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value is a “stable” imputation since it cannot be disrupted by the actions of
any coalition of agents.
2.2.2 Shapley value with one syndicate
Let us assume that k agents of type 1, k ≤ n, decide to establish a syndicate,
denoted by J1, J1 ⊂ I1. As a consequence, a new game is played which has
formally (since the syndicate acts as a single agent) (1 + 2n− k) players.
The Shapley value is represented by three numbers (xˆ1s, xˆ1ns, xˆ2) where
xˆ1s denotes the value of a syndicated worker; xˆ1ns the value of a nonsyndi-
cated worker and xˆ2, the value of a capitalist. The purpose of this section
is to determine this Shapley value.
First, by definition, the value of a syndicated worker, xˆ1s, is given by:
xˆ1s =
1
k
∑
S⊂N
J1 /∈S
s! (2n− k − s)!
(1 + 2n− k)!
[v (S ∪ {J1})− v (S)]
We can note that the marginal contribution of syndicate J1 in a given
coalition S will depend on the number of nonsyndicated workers in S i.e.
s1 = |S ∩ I1\J1| , and on the number of capitalists in S i.e. s2 = |S ∩ I2|.
Then
xˆ1s =
1
k
n−k∑
s1=0
n∑
s2=0
(s1 + s2)! (2n− k − s1 − s2)!
(1 + 2n− k)!
(
n−k
s1
)(
n
s2
) [
s
β
2 ((s1 + k)
α − sα1 )
]
Next, we note that the value of a nonsyndicated worker, xˆ1ns, is given
by
xˆ1ns =
∑
S⊂N
1j /∈S
s! (2n− k − s)!
(1 + 2n− k)!
[v (S ∪ {1j})− v (S)]
We shall distinguish between two cases: (1) the syndicate J1 belongs to the
coalition S (first term of the following expression), (2) the syndicate J1 does
not belong to the coalition S (second term). Then
xˆ1ns =
n−k−1∑
s1=0
n∑
s2=0
(s1+s2+1)!(2n−k−s1−s2−1)!
(1+2n−k)!
(
n−k−1
s1
)(
n
s2
) [
s
β
2 ((s1 + k + 1)
α − (s1 + k)
α)
]
+
n−k−1∑
s1=0
n∑
s2=0
(s1+s2)!(2n−k−s1−s2)!
(1+2n−k)!
(
n−k−1
s1
)(
n
s2
) [
s
β
2 ((s1 + 1)
α − sα1 )
]
Finally, we deduce the value of a capitalist, xˆ2 from the property of
efficiency of the Shapley value:
xˆ2 =
1
n
[
nα+β − kxˆ1s − (n− k) xˆ1ns
]
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Similarly, the symmetric case is obtained if we assume the formation of a
syndicate of capitalists, J2, J2 ⊂ I2, composed of k members. The Shapley
value is then described by three numbers (yˆ1, yˆ2s, yˆ2ns) where yˆ1 is the value
of a worker; yˆ2s, the value of a syndicated capitalist and yˆ2ns, the value of a
nonsyndicated capitalist.
2.2.3 Shapley value with two syndicates
We now assume that k agents of type 1, k ≤ n, decide to establish a syn-
dicate, denoted by J1, J1 ⊂ I1, and that k agents of type 2, k ≤ n, decide
to establish a syndicate, denoted by J2, J2 ⊂ I2. As a consequence, a new
game is played which has 2 (n− k + 1) players.
The Shapley value is then represented by four numbers (zˆ1s, zˆ1ns, zˆ2s, zˆ2ns)
where zˆ1s denotes the value of a syndicated worker; zˆ1ns, the value of a non-
syndicated worker; zˆ2s, the value of a syndicated capitalist and zˆ2ns, the
value of a nonsyndicated capitalist. So, we want to determine successively
these four values.
First, the value of a syndicated worker, zˆ1s, is given by
zˆ1s =
1
k
∑
S⊂N
J1 /∈S
s! (2 (n− k + 1)− s− 1)!
(2 (n− k + 1))!
[v (S ∪ {J1})− v (S)]
Let s1 be the number of nonsyndicated workers in a given coalition S; and
let s2 be the number of nonsyndicated capitalists in the coalition S. We shall
again consider two cases depending on whether the syndicate J2 belongs or
not to the coalition S. Then we have
zˆ1s =
1
k
n−k∑
s1=0
n−k∑
s2=0
(s1+s2+1)!(2(n−k)−s1−s2)!
(2(n−k+1))!
(
n−k
s1
)(
n−k
s2
) [
(s2 + k)
β ((s1 + k)
α − sα1 )
]
+
1
k
n−k∑
s1=0
n−k∑
s2=0
(s1+s2)!(2(n−k)−s1−s2+1)!
(2(n−k+1))!
(
n−k
s1
)(
n−k
s2
) [
s
β
2 ((s1 + k)
α − sα1 )
]
We now define the value of a nonsyndicated worker as
zˆ1ns =
∑
S⊂N
1j /∈S
s! (2 (n− k + 1)− s− 1)!
(2 (n− k + 1))!
[v (S ∪ {1j})− v (S)]
We shall distinguish between four cases: (1) the two syndicates belong to
the coalition S (first term of the following expression), (2) the syndicate J1
belongs to the coalition S (second term), (3) the syndicate J2 belongs to
the coalition S (third term), (4) the two syndicates do not belong to the
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coalition S (fourth term). Then
zˆ1ns =
n−k−1∑
s1=0
n−k∑
s2=0
(s1+s2+2)!(2(n−k)−s1−s2−1)!
(2(n−k+1))!
(
n−k−1
s1
)(
n−k
s2
) [
(s2 + k)
β ((s1 + k + 1)
α − (s1 + k)
α)
]
+
n−k−1∑
s1=0
n−k∑
s2=0
(s1+s2+1)!(2(n−k)−s1−s2)!
(2(n−k+1))!
(
n−k−1
s1
)(
n−k
s2
) [
s
β
2 ((s1 + k + 1)
α − (s1 + k)
α)
]
+
n−k−1∑
s1=0
n−k∑
s2=0
(s1+s2+1)!(2(n−k)−s1−s2)!
(2(n−k+1))!
(
n−k−1
s1
)(
n−k
s2
) [
(s2 + k)
β ((s1 + 1)
α − sα1 )
]
+
n−k−1∑
s1=0
n−k∑
s2=0
(s1+s2)!(2(n−k)−s1−s2+1)!
(2(n−k+1))!
(
n−k−1
s1
)(
n−k
s2
) [
s
β
2 ((s1 + 1)
α − sα1 )
]
Similarly, the value of a syndicated capitalist, zˆ2s, and the value of a
nonsyndicated capitalist, zˆ2ns, are determined.
3 Results
We first assume that all agents of type 1 form a syndicate whereas the agents
of the other type remain unorganized.
Assumption 1 J1 = I1 and J2 = ∅.
Proposition 1 Let xˆ1s(n) be the asymptotic Shapley value of a syndicated
worker under assumption 1 and let ϕ1(n) be the asymptotic Shapley value
of a worker in an economy without syndicate, then:
xˆ1s(n) > ϕ1 (n)if and only if α < 1,∀β > 0,
where xˆ1s(n) ∼
1
1 + β
nα+β−1 and ϕ1(n) ∼
α
α+ β
nα+β−1, for n large enough.
Proof. Let xˆ1s be the Shapley value of a syndicated worker. Since k = n
and s1 = 0, we have:
xˆ1s =
1
n+ 1
n∑
s2=0
nα−1s
β
2
Therefore, we obtain the asymptotic Shapley value:
xˆ1s(n) ∼
1
1 + β
nα+β−1, for n large enough.
The stability of syndicate J1 depends on the comparison of the mem-
bers of the syndicate with the members of the unorganized coalition, thus
we compare xˆ1s(n) to ϕ1(n). Since ϕ1(n) ∼
α
α+ β
nα+β−1, we obtain the
desired result.
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Proposition 1 implies that, under assumption 1, the imputation xˆ1s(n)
is strictly preferred by the members of the syndicate to the imputation
ϕ1(n). Hence, the syndicate J1 is stable (A-stable) when the parameter α
is less than one and the syndicate J1 is not stable when α is greater than
one. The critical value, α = 1, corresponds to the case where the marginal
productivity of labor equals the average productivity of labor, i.e., Pmz1 =
PMz1 . So, if α < 1, the marginal productivity of labor is decreasing and
we have Pmz1 < PMz1 which means that a worker’s average contribution is
always greater than a worker’s marginal contribution.
Therefore, as the number of agents is increased, a syndicate composed
of all the agents of one type (the agents of the other type remaining un-
organized) is A-stable if the decreasing marginal productivity property of
the factor owned by this syndicate is satisfied, whatever be the marginal
productivity of the other factor. In other words, a monopoly syndicate is
stable when its marginal productivity is less than its average productivity.
We now assume that both agents of type 1 and type 2 form a monopoly
syndicate.
Assumption 2 J1 = I1 and J2 = I2.
Proposition 2 Let zˆ = (zˆ1s, zˆ2s) be the Shapley value under assumption 2
and let ϕ(n) ∼ (ϕ1(n), ϕ2(n)) be the asymptotic Shapley value in an economy
without syndicate, then:{
zˆ1s < ϕ1(n)
zˆ2s > ϕ2 (n)
, if and only if α > β,
where zˆ1s = zˆ2s =
1
2n
α+β−1, ∀n,
and ϕ1(n) ∼
α
α+ β
nα+β−1, ϕ2(n) ∼
β
α+ β
nα+β−1, for n large enough.
Proof. Let zˆ1s be the Shapley value of a syndicated worker. Since k = n
and s1 = s2 = 0, we have:
zˆ1s =
1
2n
α+β−1, ∀α, β > 0
Similarly, let zˆ2s be the Shapley value of a syndicated capitalist. Since
k = n and s1 = s2 = 0, we have:
zˆ2s =
1
2n
α+β−1, ∀α, β > 0
In order to analyze the stability of these two syndicates, we compare zˆ1s
to ϕ1(n) and zˆ2s to ϕ2(n), and then we obtain the desired result.
11
Proposition 2 shows that, under assumption 2, only the monopoly syndi-
cate which has the weaker marginal productivity will be A-stable. In other
words, since α and β measure the impact of a variation in inputs on the
quantity of output, the syndicate J2 will be A-stable if the impact on out-
put from the variation of capital inputs is weaker than that of a variation
in labor input, i.e. α > β.
We will now consider another definition of stability: C-stability. With-
out loss of generality, we can compare the situation of a syndicated worker
when two monopoly syndicates are present and when there is only a syndi-
cate of capitalists, i.e., zˆ1s to yˆ1.
Assumption 3 J1 = ∅ and I2 = J2.
Proposition 3 Let zˆ1s be the Shapley value of a syndicated worker under
assumption 2 and let yˆ1(n) be the asymptotic Shapley value of a worker
under assumption 3, then:
zˆ1s > yˆ1(n) if and only if α < 1, ∀β > 0,
where zˆ1s =
1
2n
α+β−1, ∀n, and yˆ1(n) ∼
α
1 + α
nα+β−1, for n large enough.
Proof. In Proposition 2, we have shown that zˆ1s =
1
2n
α+β−1 when k = n
and s1 = s2 = 0.
Let us consider the formation of a monopoly syndicate of capitalists.
Some easy computations give the asymptotic Shapley value of a worker:
yˆ1(n) ∼
α
1 + α
nα+β−1, for n large enough.
We compare zˆ1s to yˆ1(n) and we obtain the desired result.

Proposition 3 implies that a syndicate of workers is C-stable when the
parameter α is less than one. In other words, this means that the formation
of a syndicate of capitalists leads to the formation of the syndicate of work-
ers if the marginal productivity of labor is decreasing. Hence, the formation
of a syndicate of one type can lead to the formation of a syndicate of the
other type.
We can summarize our results in the following bi-matrix4:
4Given n, the players will share the average productivity y
n
= nα+β−1 according to
the shares that are varying with the type of the market ((I1, I2) = bilateral oligopoly,
(I1, ∅) = monopoly syndicate, (∅, I2) = monopsony, (∅, ∅) = competitive economy).
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J2 = I2 J2 = ∅
J1 = I1
1
2
,
1
2
1
1 + β
,
β
1 + β
J1 = ∅
α
1 + α
,
1
1 + α
α
α+ β
,
β
α+ β
In the light of empirical studies, we are able to let α < 1, β < 1 and
α > β (and, where applicable, α+β slightly greater than 1) (see, for example,
Pendharkar and al. [2008]). Which implies for the workers:
1
1 + β
>
α
α+ β
>
1
2
>
α
1 + α
and for the preferences we get:
(I1, ∅) ≻I1 (∅, ∅) ≻I1 (I1, I2) ≻I1 (∅, I2)
(∅, I2) ≻I2 (I1, I2) ≻I2 (∅, ∅) ≻I2 (I1, ∅)
4 Conclusion
This paper analyses the stability of syndicates of factor owners in a pro-
ductive economy characterized by increasing returns to scale. Our analysis,
based on the Shapley value, allows us to find a fair allocation of the gains
of cooperation and the conditions under which syndicates are stable.
We prove that the formation of a monopoly syndicate can increase the
bargaining power of its members in terms of the Shapley value. We de-
termine conditions for the monopoly to be stable: it turns out that the
stability of a syndicate critically depends upon the marginal productivity of
the factor that its members own.
Under the particular conditions where α, β < 1, α > β, in the presence
of increasing returns to scale, we show that workers have never interest that
capitalists form a syndicate; whereas capitalists still have interest to form
it. Then, it remains to workers to form a syndicate so as to maximize their
payoffs.
Under these circumstances it seems that the answer to the question to
know whether the presence of a type of syndicate leads to the formation of a
syndicate of the other type, is not trivial. Thus, it is true that workers have
always interest in forming a syndicate if one exists in capitalist and vice
versa. Alongside the capitalists still have an interest in forming a syndicate,
in which case, the presence or absence of a labor syndicate cannot be con-
sidered as incentive. Finally, starting from a situation of bilateral monopoly,
the workers are also willing not to form a syndicate if the capitalists do the
same.
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